Renminbi or yuan, the Chinese currency, has been the highest-profile and longest-running subject of controversy between China and its trade partners, especially the United States (US) and the European Union (EU). China has long been accused of intentionally manipulating renminbi's exchange rate to the US dollar 1 in order to gain its competitive advantage and keep its export artificially cheaper. The undervaluded renminbi, as often asserted, is the key reason for the growth in China's foreign-exchange reserves and its transformation into the "world's manufacturing powerhouse" as well as the source of job losses 2 and trade deficits in other countries. Due to the constant political pressure from the US, the EU and Japan, 3 the exchange rate of renminbi has steadily appreciated against the US dollar by about 40 per cent (about 23 per cent in normal terms) since 21 July 2005. 4 Meanwhile, China has adopted a new foreign-exchange rate regime described as "a market-based floating exchange rate system," where the exchange rate is adjusted on the foundation of "market supply and demand with reference to a basket of currencies," though "in accordance with China's needs for reform and development." 5 China's huge foreign-exchange reserves 6 derive from both current 7 and capital accounts centring on trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), respectively. Currently, the capital control consists of three pillars, controls over foreign debts, FDI and international portfolio investment. 8 Different from the control over foreign debt (owed by the Chinese government to international organizations and international financial institutions) and FDI (made by foreign companies into China), the control over international portfolio investments centres on the inflows and 
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10 More favourable treatment is granted to the inbound FDI due to its far lesser volatility than other types of capital inflows 11 and the benefits it brings to the national economy such as the import of advanced technology, transfer of managerial expertise, increase of domestic competition and inflow of sufficient funding to finance the investment expansion. At the regulatory level, China has to loosen its restrictions on the inbound FDI because of the entrance and procedural liberalization under its World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments. By contrast, the capital controls are often treated as an effective tool preventing an outflow of deposits from Chinese banks and a destabilization of the entire economic system.
12
The latest reform features a strategy of shifting from one biased against outflows towards one managing two-way cross-border capital flows in a more balanced fashion. The new regulatory regime has emerged under which most transactions dealing with offshore assets are freed somehow even though a number of capital transactions remain regulated to resist depreciation pressures on the exchange rate. Currently, the People's Bank of China (PBOC), the central bank of China, is the main policy maker of foreign-exchange policies, while the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) is the watchdog recommending, formulating and implementing foreign-exchange policies and rules as well as overseeing the transfer of foreign exchange out of and into China under the capitalaccount transactions.
13 This chapter will review China's capital-control measures imposed on the capital-account transactions, i.e. Chinese companies' outbound investment in foreign jurisdictions (first section) and cross-border remittances of renminbi for settlement, settlement trade transactions with renminbi, issuance of renminbi-denominated bonds in Hong Kong and by foreigners in the Mainland (together in the second section). These regulatory measures will be reviewed from a political economy perspective in the third section. A short conclusion follows in the final section.
